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Abstract
The spread of ideas in online social networks is a crucial phenomenon to un-
derstand nowadays the proliferation of fake news and their impact in democ-
racies. This makes necessary to use models that mimic the circulation of
rumors. The law of large numbers as well as the probability distribution of
contact groups allow us to construct a model with a minimum number of
hypotheses. Moreover, we can analyze with this model the presence of very
polarized groups of individuals (humans or bots) who spread a rumor as soon
as they know about it. Given only the initial number of individuals who know
any news, in a population connected by an instant messaging application, we
first deduce from our model a simple function of time to study the rumor
propagation. We then prove that the polarized groups can be detected and
quantified from empirical data. Finally, we also predict the time required by
any rumor to reach a fixed percentage of the population.
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1. Introduction
The extraordinary global increase in online social network usage, and the
ease of sending messages ubiquitously and almost instantaneously, have pro-
vided a fertile ground for the dissemination of fake news [1, 2]. In addition,
the use of these platforms can inevitably have deep social and political con-
sequences. For instance, a disinformation campaign became a topic of wide
public concern during the Brexit referendum in the UK, as well as during
the US presidential election, both in 2016 [3, 1, 4].
The seriousness of the situation due to the current and growing phe-
nomenon of fake news lies not only in the speed and ease of reaching broad
and very different strata of society but also in the negligible cost of this new
form of worldwide interactive communication. This is a novel and simulta-
neously complicated situation that makes it necessary to study rumor propa-
gation models in order to design appropriate countermeasures and avoid, for
example, their potential impact on destabilization of liberal democracies [2].
Nevertheless, online social networks cannot be considered solely as mere
media responsible for the propagation of fake news, since first they work in
an inverse manner spreading real news. For this reason, understanding how
ideas spread in social networks, as an element of both economic and political
marketing, becomes a fundamental task. Companies, as well as political
parties, that are interested in promoting their products or disseminating
their ideas to the population, can benefit from the use of new and cheaper
communication channels based on mobile applications such as WhatsApp
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(with millions of users worldwide), which are much more profitable than
traditional marketing strategies, publicity campaigns, etc.
In order to avoid the destabilizing effects due to the spread of fake news, it
is necessary to provide a suitable propagation model of rumors. In this sense,
it is essential to first identify the fundamental variables that characterize this
phenomenon. Given that there are great similarities between the spread of
news and rumors and the spread of infectious diseases, a classic approach to
study how information is disseminated is to define epidemiological models of
populations [5, 6]. Additionally, other studies focused on identifying the most
efficient spreaders in a network [7]. In [8], two models were presented with
the assumption that either spreaders are not always active or an ignorant
is not interested in spreading the rumor. The effect of homogeneity and
polarization, i.e. echo chambers, in the spreading of misinformation online
was studied in [9]. Finally, why rumors spread so quickly in social networks
was analyzed in [10]. It should be noted that an element common to all
these different approaches is that it is necessary to assume certain more or
less believable hypotheses.
In this study, we present a news dissemination model base on a proba-
bilistic approach that allow us to use the law of large numbers to determine
the probability function of sending messages. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no similar result for rumor spread models and we can only refer to
the discussion in [11]. One of our main contributions is that additional un-
realistic hypotheses are not necessary. Therefore, we provide a more general
rumor propagation model, which is also robust, without any limitation due
to simplifications in the hypotheses.
3
In addition to reducing the number of necessary hypotheses, another ma-
jor issue when modelling is to obtain a faithful description of the reality that,
in the particular case of social networks, is manifested by its heterogeneity.
In our model, this heterogeneity is reflected in the fact that people are related
through groups, with different sizes and not with the same sensitivity to the
propagation of a message. In particular, the strongly polarized like-minded
population groups are one of the key elements to amplify the spread of ru-
mors. People belonging to this type of group will forwa all kind of news (false
or not) with the sole criterion that they are related to their own ideological
line.
It is interesting to note that news dissemination models hardly take into
account the different reactions that people show when faced with true and
false news. In this sense, there are two underlying problems for any model:
the first refers to the different reaction of people to the veracity/falsity of the
news and the second is related to how the certainty of the news is validated.
In order to give an answer to these problems with our model, we simply
focus on the propagation of the message. Thus, the authenticity or falsity
of the message will be determined solely by the probability of propagation.
Note that, except in very specific cases such us “the president has been
killed”, the information is judged according to the sender and is considered
true based only on the idiosyncrasy of the person who receives it (similarly
to those people who belong to the same ideological line will do it). On
the contrary, that information will be considered false by those who have a
different ideology, opposed to the sender’s. The continuous variations of the
ideological spectrum in the population imply the need to constantly evaluate
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the truth/falsity of a message. This phenomenon can be perfectly described
by means of the different probabilities of propagation of the message: the
more inclined the population is towards the conservatives, the greater the
probability of spreading news that damages the image of the liberals and
vice versa.
In fact, the probability of news propagation is a fundamental parameter
when modeling the dissemination of ideas, since, if most of the individuals in a
network propagate a message with low probability but a group, which we call
the group of uncritical senders (USG), does so uncritically with probability
100%, the USG will be identified as a very polarized group.
The USG label is surely well defined in the sense that humans, not robots,
accelerate the spread of false news more than the truth [12]. The fact that
people react differently when they receive the news, mainly depending on
whether or not they have an ideological affinity, makes the probability of
news propagation a key parameter to present and analyze our results.
We must be aware that social networks are dynamic, that is, they are con-
stantly changing. Because of this, the proposed models can only be useful if
they can show how the spread of news changes when the relevant parameters
of those models vary continuously. That information must be provided, as
we will, with an analytic formulation. Therefore, we present a predictable
model that can be used to eliminate or mitigate the dangerous consequences
of spreading fake news as, for instance, biasing the vote in government elec-
tions, misallocating resources after natural disasters or terrorist actions, mis-
guiding in the investment measures after the stock market crash, etc. All
this with a great political, social and economic impact, due to the fact that
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the number of people who are currently only informed of the news through
their social networks is increasing.
Finally, given that it is a well-known fact that news does not necessarily
have to be disseminated from a single source, but that there may be dif-
ferent sources from which the same news spreads in cascade to the entire
social network, we work with our propagation model of rumors but using
different initial conditions, that is, different seeds are considered in the pop-
ulation. These seeds represent different groups of individuals that initiate
the propagation of the same rumor in the network.
Our results show how the distributions of the propagation probability of
news in social networks change over time as a function of polarized groups of
uncritical senders. Particularly, we found that the probability of spreading
rumors varies from an exponential evolution to a logistic one. As a result,
simply observing how fake news is spread in a social network, we can detect
with our model the presence of a polarized group of uncritical individuals,
which becomes a very useful tool to design countermeasures to deactivate
such groups, if necessary.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a
model of rumor propagation in a social network based on WhatsApp. This is
a numerical model defined from empirical data. In particular, the standard
distributions of the number of person-to-person contacts and of group sizes
were estimated experimentally. In addition, the key parameters that allows
us to analyze the phenomena of spreading rumors are identified and their
values are also estimated. In section 3, analytic expressions that fit the
numerical simulations are deduced. Based on these expressions, a theoretical
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model is proposed that captures the observed behavior and sets the basis
to interpret the dynamics that led to those results. In section 4, we discuss
the potential applications of our model and its predictive capabilities. We
conclude the paper in section 5.
2. Methodology
Taking into account that WhatsApp is one of the most popular messaging
application all over the world (e.g. it reaches a 70% of the total population
in Spain 1), we simulate our rumor propagation model in a social network
based on this application. In order to properly simulate message spreading
over this network, we must distinguish two types of contacts, person-to-
person and groups. We also need to know the standard distributions of the
number of person-to-person contacts and of group sizes. Both were estimated
experimentally as described below.
2.1. Statistical characterization of a WhatsApp network
A sample of 150 college students (age range 18-20 years) was used to ob-
tain the statistical distribution of person-to-person and groups in the What-
sApp network. Individuals were asked about the number of contacts in their
cell phone contact lists, the number of WhatsApp groups with three or more
members and the sizes of those groups (number of members including them-
selves). Moreover, they were asked about the number of frequent individual
WhatsApp contacts, defined as those to whom they would text with a con-
troversial message they learned from any source.
1https://www.messengerpeople.com/global-messenger-usage-statistics/#Spain
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In any contact list, there are many contacts that do not belong to any
group (meaning by group a set of persons linked by a common interest).
Hence, we posed the following question: in case they learned about a partic-
ularly “hot news”, to whom of their contacts would they expressly text for
commenting on it? Obviously, that “hot news” would not be sent to their
attorney or plumber and, depending on the topic, neither to a relative. Thus,
we define the groups of size two as those contacts in the contact list that,
although they may be members of any WhatsApp group, would receive a
message directly from the user about a news considered especially relevant.
Only these size-two groups constitute the set of person-to-person links of
each WhatsApp user.
From our sample data, we find out that the number m of person-to-person
contacts an individual has follows approximately a normal distribution
N(m,µ, σ) =
1
2piσ
e−
(m−µ)2
2σ2 (1)
where µ = 7.35 and σ = 4.38.
The group size distribution, for sizes of 3 ≤ N ≤ 30 members (that
included the majority of our samples), fits an exponential distribution
E(N) = 1− exp(−λ(N − a)) (2)
where coefficients are adjusted from the data as λ = 0.1113 ± 0.0019 and
a = 1.41± 0.12 (r2 = 0.9959). See Figure 1.
In summary, the groups between 3 and 30 individuals in size are charac-
terized by an exponential distribution function, while the groups of size 2, i.e.
person-to-person links, are characterized by a normal distribution function.
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Figure 1: WhatsApp empirical group size distribution (left) and the goodness of fit of the
cumulative distribution function (right) to an exponential (r2 = 0.9959). N represents the
number of individuals in a group (3 ≤ N ≤ 30), E(N) represents the empirical distribution
function, i.e. the fraction of groups of size ≤ N , and Eest(N) is the estimation of E(N).
2.2. The model
In this paper, we introduce a novel model where individuals are linked
either by person-to-person relations or by belonging to the same WhatsApp
group. These links fit the distributions obtained in section 2.1. It is worth
noticing that, initially, a given fraction of population, named the seed, knows
a rumor. This rumor may spread to other linked individuals at each itera-
tion during the numerical simulations. The rumor propagation proceeds
iteratively taking into account two main rules. First, the individual propaga-
tion probability at each iteration is given by a uniform distribution. Second,
there may also be a group of individuals, the so-called uncritical senders
group, which always propagates the rumor at each iteration, i.e. with an
individual propagation probability of 100%.
As the numerical simulations were repeated independently a large number
of times and then we averaged the result, the law of large numbers guaran-
tees that the final law of distribution followed by the rumor propagation is
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determined as well as the time required for a rumor to reach a given fraction
of the population. An important feature of the model is that it shows when
a population is polarized regarding a given rumor.
For the sake of enabling a better understanding of the model that is
developed in detail below, we provide here some useful definitions:
Burned: A person who knows the rumor is said to be a burned individual.
Observe that if an individual is burned, he remains in that state until
the end of the rumor propagation process.
Sender: A person who knows the message (a burned individual) and texts
it to any of his contacts is called a sender.
Receiver: Any individual (burned or not) in the population that is reached
by the message is said to be a receiver.
Seed: All those individuals who know the rumor at the beginning of its
propagation constitute the seed, i.e. the set of burned individuals at
the initial time t = 0.
Person-to-person relation: A direct link between two individuals of the pop-
ulation is called a person-to-person relation. This relationship is singled
out from the group relationship because it represents a one-way link.
If an individual i is connected with another individual j, then j may
receive text messages sent by i, but this does not imply that individual
j could also send messages to i.
Group: The set of three or more individuals in the population that are
interconnected, meaning that what one of the individuals sends to the
10
group is received by all others in the group simultaneously.
Individual propagation probability (PIP ): The probability of the rumor
being sent by a burned individual, who knows the rumor, to one of
its contacts (person-to-person probability) or groups in the WhatsApp
network.
Individual initial probability (PII): The probability that individuals are
part of the seed. That is, the probability that an individual knows the
message at the beginning of the process of spreading the rumor.
Uncritical senders group (USG): The set of individuals who automatically
send the message to all of their contacts when they receive it is named
the uncritical senders group. Hence, PIP is always equal to 100% for
individuals in the USG.
USG membership probability (PUSG): The probability that individuals
belong to the USG. It represents the fraction of the population that
forms the USG. The size of the USG is fixed as an initial condition and
once fixed, and randomly chosen the individuals that are a part of it,
it does not change.
2.3. Model algorithms
The model consists of two main steps. First, an algorithm that generates
populations of connected individuals as described in section 2.1. Second,
another algorithm simulating the spreading rumors among these populations.
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2.3.1. Populations
In order to simulate a network with the statistical properties described
in section 2.1, we proceeded to implement an algorithm that reproduces
that structure. That is, given a population of Np individuals, we establish
connections between pairs of individuals following the normal distribution
(1) and also generate groups of 3 to 30 interconnected individuals with group
sizes given by (2).
When come to consider group construction, we will separate groups formed
by just 2 individuals from groups formed by 3 or more individuals; the rea-
son is that in two-person groups, connections are not bidirectional (as we
explained above), whereas for groups with 3 or more individuals it is.
We will assume a normal distribution (1) for the number of 2-groups
an individual belongs to, having the mean and standard deviation fitted
from our sample. From that distribution, the number of individuals nm
that are expected to have a number m of person-to-person connections was
computed, for m = 0, 1, . . . , 30. That is, first the number of individuals in
the population having zero person-to-person contacts, n0 = N(0, µ, σ) was
computed and then, recursively, the number of individuals having m person-
to-person contacts nm = N(m,µ, σ) − N(m − 1, µ, σ) for m = 1, . . . , 30.
Then the nm individuals having m contacts were chosen randomly from the
population, linking them to other individuals also randomly chosen. Notice
that these relationships, by their very nature, are not bidirectional given that
they are not proper WhatsApp groups, but the initial individual will send
messages to the destination individual, but that does not have to work in the
reciprocal.
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To compute the number of groups of size 3 or more an individual belongs
to, we will use the exponential distribution in (2) with the parameters fitted
from our sample. Specifically, the number of groups of size i is calculated as
E(i)−E(i−1) for i = 3, 4, . . . , N . Once known the number of groups of each
size (from 3 to 30 individuals), the individuals of the population belonging
to each group are randomly chosen.
Thirty populations with 10000 individuals each were simulated following
the previous procedure, taking into account that only 70% of the individuals
(the penetration of WhatsApp in Spanish population) should be connected
either person-to-person or to groups of sizes 3 to 30. Each of these simulations
provided a network of connections between individuals of the population.
2.3.2. Message spreading
Once the population has been simulated (see above) the rumor spreads
among its individuals according to the following rules:
1. The fraction of the population that knows the rumor, that is the initial
seed, is chosen initially from the connected population given by PIP .
2. One individual belonging to the see is randomly chosen
3. The groups to which that individual belongs are identified
4. That individual will pass the rumor to each of these groups with a
probability PIP ; for this, a uniformly distributed random value in [0, 1)
is generated for each group, and the rumor is spread to the group if
that value is less than PIP
Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until all seed individuals are exhausted.
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5. All the individuals that know the rumor become part of the seed, and
the propagation process is repeated 100 times; this number of iterations
is chosen because in most simulations the rumor reaches the entire
population before that time.
Once the initial seed and the USG have been chosen, according to the
individual initial probability (PII), the uncritical senders group membership
probability (PUSG), and the individual propagation probability (PIP ) that
characterize the initiation and propagation of the messages on the social
network, the algorithm proceeds according to the following rules:
i) The rumor is propagated among the individuals in the population for
100 iterations (the simulation unit of time).
ii) At each iteration, every burned individual in the population, that is,
every individual who knows the rumor, will communicate it to each of
its contacts with probability PIP .
iii) If an individual belongs to the USG and is burned, it will propagate
the message to all of its contacts (that is, PIP equals 1 for individuals
in the USG).
iv) After every iteration, burned individuals (and WhatsApp groups) are
recorded and counted.
Given that message transmission is a random process, message spreading
algorithm is run 50 times on each population using, for that population al-
ways the same initial seed. The result after finishing each run is the series of
numbers of burned individuals at each iteration. The final result is summa-
rized as the average number of these 50 series. Along the same lines, given
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that each population is computed as a random sample from a probability
distribution, in section 3 we will work with the results obtained by averaging
over the 30 populations, in order to characterize the temporal evolution of
the average number of burned individuals for each set of parameters PIP , PII
and PUSG.
3. Numerical results
To proceed with the simulations, the parameter space PII × PIP × PUSG
is sampled at 500 points given by the following tuples (u, v, w) where u, v ∈
{k · 10−2 : k = 1, 2, . . . , 10} and w ∈ {k · 10−2 : k = 0, 3, 5, 7, 10}. Each of
these 500 points characterizes individuals and groups in a simulated popula-
tion. For each of the 500 points, 30 such populations with 10000 individuals
each were randomly generated following the algorithm described in 2.3. No-
tice that although these populations are different, they are statistically the
same because they were generated using the same parameters at the same
point of the parameter space. For each of these 30 populations, a news was
spread over the network during 100 iterations, and this random process was
repeatedly simulated 50 times, choosing a different initial condition for each
of the 30 populations (the seed individuals who know the information at the
beginning of the propagation). The propagation time series was computed
as the average of the 50 simulations for a given population, resulting in 30
averaged spreading evolutions corresponding to the 30 statistically identical
populations. Finally, the average over the 30 populations was computed as
the propagation time series corresponding to one of the 500 points in the
parameter space.
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The goal of this numeric modeling is to fit an analytic expression that
summarizes the spreading of the news corresponding to the model described
above.
3.1. Case PUSG = 0
To see the effect polarized groups have on news spreading, it was first
needed to know how news spread without those groups (PUSG = 0). In this
section these results are shown and an analytic expression fitted to them.
The analysis is based on data from simulations obtained as the aver-
age number of burned individuals at the n-th iteration taking into account
all populations (30) and all 50 simulations performed on each population.
That is, the behavior of the function corresponding to the average number
of burned individuals at each iteration is studied:
f(n) =
Total of burned individuals at n-th iteration
no. of populations× no. of simulations×Np
where Np is the number of individuals of the population connected by What-
sApp, and n = 1, . . . , 100.
The space of parameters is sliced in sections, that is, we study how rumor
spread in populations for different values of PII ∈ [0, 0.1] and, for each of
these values, the behavior for different values of PIP ∈ [0, 0.1] is also studied.
The simulation results f(n) (see Figure 2) picture the average evolution
of the fraction of burned individuals after successive iterations (indexed by
n) that approach a continuous function F (t) dependent of time t.
For values of PII around 10%, function F (t) is well approximated by an
exponential of the form
Fexp(t) = 1− A exp(−t/a)
16
PII = 3% PIP = 2%
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
f(
n
)
n
f(
n
)
f(
n
)
f(
n
)
PIP = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9%
f(
n
)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
f(
n
)
n
f(
n
)
f(
n
)
f(
n
)
PII = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9%
f(
n
)
Figure 2: Average number of burned individuals f(n) at each iteration n for different
values of PIP (left, PII = 3%) and PII (right, PIP = 2%). Fixed parameter: PUSG = 0.
The blue lines correspond to the fitting expression (3) in each case.
whereas for smaller values of PII a better fit is obtained using a logistic
function
Flog(t) =
1
1 +B exp(−2t/a)
Therefore, we construct a function that fits the data in the entire range by
changing from one form to the other through a parameter :
F (t) =
C exp[(1 + )(t− b)/a]− 1
2
1− + C exp[(1 + )(t− b)/a]
(3)
where a, b,  and C are the fitted coefficients whose values depend on simula-
tion parameters PII and PIP (how, will be shown in what follows). Coefficient
a represents a characteristic time scale. Coefficient b has the meaning of a
time origin, thus can be taken as zero.
To fulfill the initial condition F (t = 0) = PII (the initial fraction is just
the seed), C had to be taken as a function of a, b,  and PII given by:
C(a, b, ) =
1 + 2
1−PII
(1− PII) exp[(1 + )b/a] (4)
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From the fitting of the simulation data for different PII and PIP , an
expression is given for  in the form:
 = 1 +
aaPII
1 + exp(bb/a)
(5)
where aa is less than zero, in order to produce an  between 0 and 1. Likewise,
a is fitted to:
1/a = cc P eeIP (6)
which leads to a characteristic time a tending to infinity, when the probability
PIP tends to zero (that is, if the propagation probability is very small, the
time a rumour will take to spread over the entire network will become very
large). The values of aa, bb, cc and ee can be found in table 1 (for PUSG = 0).
The power law (6) did not provide a good collapse of all the points towards
the fitting curve (see Fig. 5a). Thus, in order to achieve that collapse (see
Fig. 5b), a factor (1+ggPII) is considered to correct for the small dependency
that a showed on PII , resulting in an expression of the form
1/a = cc P eeIP (1 + gg PII) (7)
Inserting into (3) the expressions for C,  and a given by (4), (5) and (7)
an expression for F (t) is obtained.
It is remarkable that all the resulting expressions depend exclusively of
PIP , PII and PUSG so that the number of burned individuals at a given
iteration n, are given by (9) in terms of just these parameters. Hence, the
number of burned individuals can be computed at any time, given a point
(PUSG, PIP , PII) in the parameter space, or vice versa, that point in the
parameter space can be computed once the time required to burn a given
fraction of the connected population has been fixed.
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Figure 3: Average number of burned individuals f(n) at each iteration n for different
values of PUSG. Fixed parameters: PII = 2% and PIP = 1%. The results of fitting the
simulation data to the analytic expression (3) are also shown (blue lines).
3.2. Case PUSG 6= 0: Effect of the uncritical senders group
Assuming the presence of very polarized groups among the population,
what we call the uncritical senders group, it is necessary to see how their
existence modifies the spread of news just described. The introduction of
the USG affects the evolution of the fraction of the population a rumor
reaches at a given time, as the simulations show. Some results of these
numerical simulations are shown in Figure 3, together with their respective
fitting to expressions formally identical to (3), which shows its validity also
for PUSG 6= 0.
The relationship (5) between  and 1/a obtained above for PUSG = 0 is
still valid for PUSG 6= 0, according to the numerical results (see Figure 4 and
table 1). Also expression (7) for 1/a in terms of PIP and PII remains valid
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(see Figure 5 and table 1).
Nevertheless, the effect of considering a USG in the network makes that
the coefficients aa, bb, cc, ee and gg in equations (5) and (7) become functions
of PUSG. The functional expressions of aa, bb, cc, ee and gg were derived
from the numerical results (for PUSG ∈ [0, 0.1]) as follows:
aa = aa1 + aa2PUSG + aa3PUSG
2
bb = bb1 + bb2PUSG
4/(1 + bb3PUSG
3)
cc = cc1 + cc2PUSG + cc3PUSG
2
ee = ee1 + ee2PUSG + ee3PUSG
2
(8)
where the values of the new coefficients are given in Table 2. Substituting
expressions (8) in equations (5) and (7), and these in equations (4) and (3),
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Figure 5: Left: Fitted values of the coefficient 1/a for different values of PIP and PUSG
(and of PII). The graph of the power law expression (6) is also shown (blue lines). Right:
Values of h(PII) =
1/a
1+ggPII
for different values of PIP and PUSG. Taking into account the
effect of PII on 1/a, the correction given by (7) is shown (green lines). Notice how the
data now collapse to the modified power law.
the general equation for the evolution of F (t) is obtained, exclusively in terms
of the parameters PIP , PII and PUSG, as was our goal.
3.3. Dynamical spreading model
In this section we present a theoretical model that captures the behav-
iors described above. For that, we will interpret our discrete time model in
terms of a continuous time model that may be derived from a differential
equation. For that, it is enough to see that PIP is a probability per unit time
of a message being propagated by one individual to another or to its group,
being that unit time the time separating one iteration from the next one.
Expression (3), describing the fraction of burned individuals as a function of
time turns out to be a solution of the following differential equation:
dF/dt =
2
a
[
1− 
2
+ F
]
(1− F ) (9)
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If this equation is interpreted as a law of mass action, the coefficient A = 2
a
would stand for the spreading velocity towards the unburned population
(1 − F ) of news originating in the burned population F plus an “invisible”
population given by the additional term G = 1−
2
.
In order to find out the meaning of this “invisible” population (which is
constant along the spreading process), let us consider the case of PII → 0,
for which → 1. Then, employing (5), equation (9) tends to
dF/dt = 1/a
[
aaPII
1 + exp(bb/a)
+ F
]
(1− F )
that is, the “invisible” population is proportional to the seed population that
knows the rumor at t = 0.
4. Discussion
For further clarification, we first summarize the procedure developed
above to obtain the function F (t), which depends only on parameters PIP ,
PII and PUSG. Next, we discuss our model and its capability to make pre-
dictions about the phenomenon of spreading rumors.
We outline below the steps necessary to adjust the experimental data and
find the function F (t).
First step: A partition of the parameter space is defined. For each of the
500 points in the partition, numerical simulations are performed and
the results obtained are analyzed as indicated below.
Second step: Coefficients a and  are computed using (3). C is estimated
using (4), so that the initial conditions are fulfilled.
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Third step: We study the dependence of these coefficients on the parame-
ters PIP and PII (for PUSG fixed), using (5) and (7).
Fourth step: Using the data set that was fitted in the first steps, we deduce
a general expression of the function F (t) and also analyze its depen-
dence on PUSG (see (8)).
In section 3.2, the distribution of burned individuals, F (t), was deduced
as a function dependent only on the parameters inherent to the network,
PIP , PII and PUSG. This function becomes a fundamental tool for predicting
how long fake news will take to spread and cause problems or for estimating
the time necessary for messages, as for instances a marketing campaign or
specific information, to be disseminated among the target audience.
4.1. Time necessary for a rumor to reach a fraction of the population
One of the main results of this study is that the function F (t) can be used
to estimate the number of burned individuals at any time. An immediate
consequence, no less important, is that the time necessary for a rumor to
reach a given fraction of the population can also be calculated from this
function. In summary, and more formally, the number of iterations tX (or
nX , for discrete time in our model) that are necessary for a rumor to reach
a fraction of the population X, assuming that the message begins to spread
at time t = 0, can be calculated using (3).
tX = F
−1(X) = b+
a
1 + 
log
(
1 + 2
1−X
(1−X)C
)
(10)
Therefore, the equation X = F (tX) provides an implicit relation between the
parameters inherent in the network, PII , PIP and PUSG, and the variables
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that define the necessary time tX and the fraction of the population X. As
a result, we can estimate the size of the seed (that is, the value of PII) such
that a given fraction X of the population is reached at time tX fixed, in a
network characterized by PIP and PUSG. In particular, the effect of the seed
(PII) and the size of the uncritical senders group (PUSG) can be studied to
obtain the result sought in a given population.
4.2. Time evolution from observed data
The function that models the propagation of a rumor in a network de-
pends, obviously, on the parameters associated with that particular rumor.
Our model can be used to estimate these parameters from empirical obser-
vations on how the rumor is spread. In fact, only four observations of the
number of individuals burned at four different times, since the beginning of
the propagation of a rumor, are sufficient to determine the coefficients that
fit the function F (t). Then, we can use this adjusted expression to calculate
the number of individuals burned at any time in the future.
As it is shown in figure 6, the fitted function (blue line) accurately follows
that obtained by numerically fitting the data (green dots). These approxima-
tions work for different values of PII . It should be noted that the adjustment
of the coefficients is done for a burned fraction of the population of less than
20%, so the function thus fitted can be used to predict when a catastrophe
will occur (i.e., a large-scale spreading of an idea). Last but not least, the
adjusted coefficients are obtained not only from small values of individuals
burned in the population but, and this is the most important, from values
that remain almost unchanged over time, see figure 6.
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Figure 6: Approximations of (t, F (t)) based on the evolution of the early times. From
left to right, the values of PUSG are 0%, 3% and 7%. Fixed parameter: PII = 5% and
PIP = 1%. The dotted line (green) corresponds to numerical simulation data (n, f(n)).
The four points used to approximate the coefficients of F (t) are highlighted in red.
4.3. Network structure inference
Knowing the number of burned individuals as a function of spreading
time allows us to infer the very structure of the network in which the news
is being disseminated. Once the propagation of a rumor for a given topic is
known, its current evolution f(n) is used to estimate the coefficients a,  and
C in (3), and from them the parameters of the network, PII , PIP y PUSG,
can be calculated.
From equations (5) and (8), the value of the parameter PUSG is calculated.
Next, when entering in the function F (t) the initial value of PII , the estimated
value PUSG and the number of individuals burned X at time tX , we obtain
the value of parameter PIP .
Note that the calculation of PII and PUSG has to be performed for each
type of news, because each topic will have its own values for the parameters
PII and PUSG. Once these parameters are determined, the function F (t) can
be used to predict the propagation of similar topic news, and use that pre-
diction to design countermeasures, either to avoid further propagation, e.g.,
25
from a political point of view, or to improve the dissemination of news, e.g.,
with commercial or public information, such as the annual flu vaccination
campaign.
5. Conclusions
As far as we know, we present here a new approach to study the crucial
phenomena of rumor propagation through WhatsApp. It is noteworthy that
the results obtained in this paper, as well as our algorithms and main tech-
niques used, can be naturally extended to any other type of similar instant
messaging application.
One of our main contributions is to provide a manageable function of time
that describes the time evolution of rumor spreading taking into account only
person-to-person relationships and contact groups. To be more precise, fixed
the initial and propagation probabilities for each individual (PII and PIP ),
the function in (3) defines the fraction of the population who knows the rumor
at different times in terms of the parameters that characterize the structure
of the network and the dynamics of propagation. In fact, the values of these
parameters were estimated from the data obtained by numerical simulations
for different scenarios depending on the size of the uncritical senders group
(PUSG).
Conversely, we show that, given the temporal evolution of a rumor by a
function as in (3), it can be predicted how the message propagates throughout
the network and how much time it takes to burn a fraction of the population.
As a set of few parameters (PII , PIP and PUSG) typifies the structure of the
network, how a rumor spreads in any social network can be simulated simply
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by replacing different values of these parameters in the analytical expressions
we provide in this paper. Therefore, this information can be used to assess
how long it will take a rumor to become dangerous and, consequently, to make
decisions accordingly during that time in order to avoid the damages caused
by the disinformation. Moreover, the number of individuals that should be
burnt to ensure that the rumor reaches a fixed fraction of the population in
a given time can be calculated.
Finally, we also study the impact of the so-called uncritical senders group,
i.e. a group of individuals who automatically forward a message as soon as
they receive it. For all we know, this is a novel idea that allows us to simulate
the behavior of groups of highly polarized humans that disseminate fake news
with the vile purpose of influencing and causing major changes in society.
From our model, we can detect and estimate the size of a group of uncritical
senders in a social network by analyzing in particular how the presence of
this group changes the temporal evolution in the propagation of a rumor.
In summary, we present a model that shows how some few but key pa-
rameters influence the spread of a rumor and determine the speed with which
a rumor may reach a large part of the population. Furthermore, we study
how this rumor propagation may be manipulated both through information
(or disinformation campaigns) and a group of uncritical senders that actively
disseminate some types of news to the entire population.
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aa bb
PUSG Values Error Values Error
0% −0.0208± 0.0003 1.49% 7.32± 0.16 2.18%
3% −0.0663± 0.0006 0.91% 7.69± 0.09 1.23%
5% −0.1148± 0.0010 0.90% 8.28± 0.09 1.12%
7% −0.180± 0.002 1.12% 8.77± 0.11 1.31%
10% −0.328± 0.006 1.93% 9.47± 0.19 2.02%
cc ee
PUSG Values Error Values Error
0% 0.03204± 0.00011 0.33% 0.9381± 0.0015 0.16%
3% 0.03579± 0.00015 0.41% 0.9228± 0.0019 0.21%
5% 0.0391± 0.0002 0.51% 0.907± 0.002 0.26%
7% 0.0431± 0.0002 0.56% 0.888± 0.003 0.30%
10% 0.0521± 0.0004 0.77% 0.843± 0.004 0.43%
gg
PUSG Values Error
0% 0.00354± 0.00019 5.42%
3% 0.0036± 0.0002 6.70%
5% 0.0039± 0.0003 7.65%
7% 0.0045± 0.0003 7.54%
10% 0.0054± 0.0005 8.61%
Table 1: Coefficients and exponents obtained from fitting expressions (5) and (7) to data
from simulations with different values of PUSG.
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Parameter Value Error
aa1 -2.2 ±0.4
aa2 -63 ±18
aa3 -2410 ±170
bb1 7.319 ±0.010
bb2 1.09×106 ±0.09×106
bb3 49000 ±4000
cc1 2.405 ±0.010
cc2 4.7 ±0.5
cc3 -35 ±4
ee1 0.9375 ±0.0017
ee2 -0.25 ±0.08
ee3 -7.0 ±0.7
gg1 0.3541 ±0.0010
gg2 10800 ±600
gg3 4700 ±300
Table 2: Coefficients of equations (8).
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